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Abstract 
 
Rapid development of Internet of Things (IoT) and its whole ecosystems are opening a lot of 
opportunities that can improve humans’ quality  of life in  many aspects. One  of the promising area 
where IoT can enhance our life is in the health care sector. However, security and privacy becomes 
the main concern in the electronic Health (eHealth) systems and it becomes more challenging with the 
integration of IoT. Furthermore, most of the IoT-based health care system architecture is designed to 
be cross-organizational due to many different stakeholders in its overall ecosystems – thus increasing 
the security complexity. There are several aspects of security in the IoT-based health care system, 
among them are key management, authentication and encryption/decryption to ensure secure 
communication and access to health sensing information. This paper introduces a key management 
method that includes mutual authentication and secret key agreement to establish secure 
communication between any IoT health device with any entity from different organization or domain 
through Identity-Based Cryptography (IBC). 
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Abstrak 
 
Perkembangan Internet yang cepat dari Things (IoT) dan keseluruhan ekosistemnya membuka banyak 
kesempatan yang dapat memperbaiki kualitas hidup manusia dalam banyak aspek. Salah satu area 
yang menjanjikan dimana IoT dapat meningkatkan kehidupan kita ada di sektor perawatan kesehatan. 
Namun, keamanan dan privasi menjadi perhatian utama dalam sistem Kesehatan Elektronik (eHealth) 
dan ini menjadi lebih menantang dengan integrasi IoT. Lebih jauh lagi, sebagian besar arsitektur 
sistem perawatan kesehatan berbasis IoT dirancang untuk menjadi lintas organisasi karena banyak 
pemangku kepentingan yang berbeda dalam keseluruhan ekosistemnya - sehingga meningkatkan 
kompleksitas keamanan. Ada beberapa aspek keamanan dalam sistem perawatan kesehatan berbasis 
IoT, di antaranya adalah manajemen kunci, otentikasi dan enkripsi / dekripsi untuk memastikan 
komunikasi yang aman dan akses terhadap informasi penginderaan jauh. Makalah ini 
memperkenalkan metode manajemen kunci yang mencakup saling otentikasi dan kesepakatan kunci 
rahasia untuk membangun komunikasi yang aman antara perangkat kesehatan IoT dengan entitas dari 
berbagai organisasi atau domain melalui Identity-Based Cryptography (IBC). 
 
Kata Kunci: IoT, eHealth, Keamanan, Autentikasi, Kriptografi berbasis ID 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The convergence of IT and medical world – also 
known as eHealth – have been transforming the 
way health care services are delivered. eHealth 
offers a new means for utilizing health resources, 
such as information, money, medications, etc, and 
then  help  all the  relevant  stakeholders  to utilize  
those resources more efficiently [1]. For a country 
that has high population where some of them are 
living in remote areas, such as Indonesia that 
consists of thousands of islands, delivering health 
care services is a big issue especially when the 
specialist doctors are not well distributed through-
out the country [2], [3]. In such situation, tele 
monitoring of patients’ health status by using 
electronic medical devices that is able to com-
municate remotely through Internet with the 
advancement of IoT is a promising  solution. 
Various IoT health care services and app-
lications have been introduced, such as ECG! 
(ECG!), glucose level, and blood pressure mo-
nitoring, medication management, and a lot more 
health applications for smart phones, as reported 
in [4]. Furthermore, many well known companies 
are developing more products and services within 
the IoT for health care solutions [4]. It was also  
reported  by  McKinsey  Global  Institute  in [5] 
that the IoT-based health care applications are 
projected to create about $1.1 -  $2.5  trillion  in  
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growth  annually  by the global economy by 2025 
and form the biggest economic impact  compared  
to  the  IoT  applications  in  other  areas.  It shows 
that the IoT in health care has a very bright future, 
both in terms of benefits for people, technology 
and economy. 
With all those encouraging facts about IoT-
based health care solution, there lies big concern 
about security and privacy. There are many 
security and privacy challenges pertaining IoT- 
based health care system, such as physical attack 
and device vulnerabilities, security in the com-
munication channel and ecosystem (e.g. mutual 
authentication, key management and crypto-
graphic support), attack on the stored information, 
etc [1], [6]. On the other hand, an IoT device that 
transmit patient’s health information needs to 
comply with Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA). The IoT devices are 
also considered as having limited power, com-
putation and memory capability which imply that 
the security mechanism needs to utilize the 
device’s resources efficiently. Furthermore, the 
architecture of IoT-based health care system in 
general involves several stakeholders that belong 
to different organizations with different security 
domain and policy, which is adding more com-
plexity to the security task. 
Based on the circumstances mentioned 
earlier, it is important to provide key management 
that supports mutual authentication and secure 
data transmission between two entities within the 
IoT-based health care system that belong to 
different organizations or domains. This paper 
presents a security scheme based on IBC that 
supports all the capabilities stated before. The 
IBC-based scheme is chosen because it is essen-
tially a asymmetric key scheme, which is easier in 
key distribution and more scalable than the 
symmetric ones, while it requires no certificate in 
the practical key distribution like the other 
asymmetric key schemes, e.g. Rivest, Shamir, and 
Adelman (RSA) and Elliptic Curve Cryptography 
(ECC). The scheme provides mutual authenti-
cation and key agreement for secure communi-
cation between entities across different organi-
zations or domains, and is developed based on 
variant of Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) that 
removes the key escrow problem in original IBC 
which was introduced by Zhaohui Cheng et al. in 
2004 [7]. 
The rest of this paper is structured as 
follows: Security and privacy challenges especi-
ally in the context of IoT-based health care system 
are reviewed in Section II. The IoT-based health 
care system architecture that is referred in this 
work is presented in Section III. The proposed key 
management, authentication and key agreement 
scheme is explained in Sec- tion IV. The security 
and efficiency analysis of the proposed scheme is 
discussed in Section V. Finally the conclusion and 
some future works are given in section VI. 
 
2. Methods 
 
Security Challenges and Possible Solutions 
 
This section reviews some of the security challe-
nges on the IoT-based health care system. The 
challenges consists of two main categories: 
challenges concerning the inherent nature of IoT 
which impact the security solution and security 
challenges related to the IoT system, especially in 
health care area. Further, some possible solutions 
of the reviewed challenges are also presented 
based on some related works. 
IoT health devices are embedded with low-
speed processors. The central processing unit 
(CPU) in such devices is not very powerful in 
terms of its speed. In addition, these devices are 
not designed to perform computationally expen-
sive operations. That is, they simply act as a 
sensor or actuator. Therefore, finding a security 
solution that minimizes resource consumption and 
thus maximizes security performance is a challen-
ging task [4]. On the other hand, the number of 
IoT devices has increased gradually, and therefore 
more devices are getting connected to the global 
information network. thus, designing a highly 
scalable security scheme without compro- mising 
security requirements is another challenge [4]. 
Medical data contain very sensitive informa-
tion about patient’s health status that must be kept 
secure and private from any unauthorized people. 
Hence, hospitals and health care providers are 
obligated to exchange patients private information 
securely to comply with HIPAA. With the ubiqui-
tous and pervasive nature of IoT, security breach-
es and privacy violations are highly possible if the 
automatic data collection is not verified and 
managed properly. Patients’ sensitive personal and 
medical information could be a tampered, used or 
compromised in the absence of having real time 
monitoring. This will not only cause a threat to 
infrastructure but has a catastrophic impact of 
peoples lives. Malicious users could hijack appli-
cations and wearable devices taking control of 
peoples private information and introduce a 
devastating health and security risks [6]. 
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The other challenge is managing credentials 
and controlling access to applications and patients 
confidential information. For instance, medical 
care givers are allowed to access devices in 
response to patients sensor devices request but the 
internet connection used may be a public or 
insecure Wi-Fi network that can be easily tamper-
ed to conduct man-in-the-middle attacks. Many 
authentication techniques could be implemented 
so that patients are capable to verify and allow 
medical doctors to access their internally embed-
ded devices. but all of the sudden they lost cons-
cious and  they  are  still  desperate  to get doctors 
assistance and guidance. Some IoT healthcare ma-
nufacturing companies provide a permanent hard 
coded password to be used while accessing IoT 
devices which, the passwords are  publicly  avai-
lable  in  the  device  manual  and would be used 
to misconfigure the device that introduce risk to 
patient life [6]. 
Another challenge is implementing and dep-
loying cryptographic protocols in IoT health cloud 
correctly. Managing cryptographic keys is crucial 
but strenuous due to IoT pervasive and continuous 
capabilities. IoT ecosystem demands the use of 
concurrent authentication operation with quick 
real time respose [6]. 
HIPAA regulation related to Transmission 
Security Encryption 164.312(e)(2)(ii) mention 
that entities should implement a mechanism to 
encrypt and decrypt patient’s health information 
whenever deemed appropriate. Entities shall  pre-
pare documentation of the encryption technology 
that is implemented including policies and proce-
dures, how cryptographic key management are 
exchanged and restricting access to create and 
alter cryptographic keys. Furthermore, hardening 
the con- fidential processes such as managing and 
sharing keys is also should be audited and 
enforced [6]. 
Several security schemes that attempted to 
solve issues related to the IoT in various appli-
cations have been proposed, in which the app-
roaches can also be applied in the health care area. 
The issue of secure transmission in IoT as re-
quired in HIPAA regulation is strongly connected 
with cryptographic protocols given the fact that 
IoT consists of constrained-devices (e.g. low com-
putation, memory and power) and big numbers of 
IoT nodes that has scalability implications. Fur-
thermore, the used for encryption in secure 
communication needs proper management which 
is also related to the authentication. 
Initially, symmetric key cryptography based 
scheme was extensively researched due to its 
small key size that fits the requirement of cons-
trained devices. However, it suffers from major 
drawback in scalability. In order to address scala-
bility issue, some attempts to introduce Public 
Key Cryptography (PKC) based scheme in cons-
trained devices have also been made. It have been 
shown that it is computationally feasible to imple-
ment PKC in constrained device, especially by 
using ECC which require shorter key size com-
pared to RSA based PKC. An example of Public 
Key Infrastructure (PKI) based encryption imple-
mentation in IoT m-health devices was pre- sented 
in [8]. 
Yet, traditional PKC requires certificate 
which consumes bigger memory size and complex 
to manage. To overcome this shortcoming, a certi-
ficateless PKC scheme, known as IBC [9], [10], 
has been proposed. The basic idea of original IBE 
is, first there is a central entity called Private Key 
Generator (PKG) which is responsible to generate 
some public parameters and a master key that is 
 
Figure 1. Reference architecture of IoT-based health care across domains 
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kept secret. That  master  key  is  then used to ge-
nerate private keys for all other parties, who trust 
that particular PKG, given their IDs. Now, the 
encryption-decryption process can be done in the 
same manner as the traditional PKC with an 
exception that the public key can be generated by 
any entity using a known ID. Due to its benefits, 
e.g. certicateless and low resource requirements, 
some IBC based security schemes have also been 
applied for constrained device, such as Mobile 
Ad-hoc Networks (MANET) [11]. In IBC, any 
arbitrary string, such as the identity of participa-
ting party in communication, can be used as 
public key, thus replacing the role of certificate in 
traditional PKC. 
Several IBC schemes have also been propo-
sed for IoT. A key establishment scheme between 
two communicating entities in which one of them 
is constrained device and with the help of a proxy 
is proposed in [12]. An IBC protocol design 
pattern for Machine-to-Machine (M2M) was 
proposed in [13]. Federated end-to-end authenti-
cation for constrained IoT using IBC and ECC has 
been suggested by Markmann et al. [14]. Finally, 
an IBC based authentication scheme for M2M has 
also been proposed by Shuo Chen et al. [15]. 
 
Security Challenges and Possible Solutions 
 
This section reviews possible architecture of IoT-
based health care system from several references. 
Based on the reviews, a reference architecture will 
be chosen for this work. Furthermore, the chosen 
reference architecture will be used as a use case 
scenario for building our proposed security 
scheme. 
According to Gabriel Neagu et al. [16], the 
sensing services delivered by IoT in  general is 
based  on interaction of four entities: sensor own-
ers (SO), sensor publishers (SP), extended service 
providers (ESP), and sensor data consumers 
(SDC). The SO might be a private or a public 
organization, a commercial sensor provider or an 
individual. In case the SO decides that the data 
provided by these sensors will be available in the 
cloud it has to define  the  access  policy  to  these  
data that potential SP should implement and 
potential users should comply with. When a SDC 
(e.g. government, business organization, academic 
institution, scientific research community or indi-
vidual) is interested in accessing data provided by 
a published sensor, the SP mediates a service 
agreement between this SDC and respective SO 
where the SO responsibilities regarding sensing 
data availability and quality for the requested 
period of time, as well as their compliance with 
existing standards are detailed. 
Another entity called Sensing Service Pro-
vider (SSP) was also introduced in [16] which 
simplifies the interaction between SDC and other 
entities in its interests, including SO (for data 
availability, compliance and quality), SP (for 
access services to sensor data) and other extended 
service providers (for value added services). In 
health care specific scenario, SDC could be a 
medical institution (e.g. hospital, clinics, etc) or 
any health care service provider. Depending on 
available financial, human and technical resour-
ces, those SDC in health care may decide to 
implement IoT-based health care service either as 
an extension  of  their  existing  IT  infrastructure  
or by outsourcing it to specialized providers. In 
most cases, the second option would be more 
preferable especially by small medical institutions 
(e.g. clinics, general practitioners). Finally, the 
authors in [16] proposed that the SSP is a major 
actor who interacts with other stakeholders: SO, 
SP and health care provider as SDC. 
On the practical perspective, there can be 
many different ways of architecture design and 
deployment model of IoT-based health care sys-
tem. According to [3], one of the ongoing tele-
health pilot project in Indonesia, called tele-ECG!, 
is carried out in such a way that a well known 
cardiac hospital becomes the center of the project 
and it is serving other remotely located health care 
providers. Remote health care providers that lack 
of cardiologists may send the ECG! data of their 
patients to the cardiologists that belong to the 
referred hospital through tele-ECG! to get their 
diagnosis pertaining the cardiac issues of the 
patients’ in the remote area. 
Combining the proposed model in [16] and 
the scenario presented in [3], a reference archi-
tectural model that will be used to develop our 
security use case is proposed in Figure 1. The 
model shown in Figure 1 is a simplified version of 
the model from [16], in which SP is assumed to be 
the SSP itself and the SO is part of the health care 
providers (Clinic 1 and 2), while Hospital 1 is the 
SDC. It is also assumed that each of the health 
care provider outsourced the IoT-based health care 
system to a specialized provider (e.g. SSP 1, SSP2 
and SSP H). 
Concerning the proposed IBC security sche-
me which requires PKG, the reference archi-
tecture in Figure 1  will  have three PKG for each 
SSP domain, e.g. P KGSSP 1 ,P KGSSP 2 and P 
KGSSP H. For security reason, PKG is only acc-
essible by entities within its domain. As PKGs, 
they generate master secret keys and public 
parameters for each domain. Additionally, P 
KGSSP 1 and P KGSSP 1 also generates identities 
and corresponding private keys for all devices in 
each domain, including S1/S2, device gateways 
and medical sensors. Besides, the P KGSSP H 
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generate private keys for all registered users in 
Hospital 1. It is important to note that the user 
identity in hospital domain are created in 
registration process and then the private key is 
generated accordingly by the P KGSSP H .  
 
Proposed Method 
 
IBE Scheme without Key Escrow 
As earlier mentioned, the proposed scheme is 
developed based on  a  variant  of  IBE  that  is  
key-escrow  free  which is adapted from [7]. In 
the original IBE scheme by Boneh Franklin [10], 
there are four randomized algorithms involved, 
namely Setup, Extract, Encrypt, and Decrypt, 
while another algorithm called Publish is included 
in the IBE’s variant without key escrow. A  
summary  of  inputs  and  outputs  for all five 
algorithms is listed in Table 1, while the detail 
procedures can be reviewed in [7]. 
Please note that the Setup algorithm occur 
fully in the PKG which could happen, for instance 
in the system initialization. In the Extract 
algorithm, the PKG receives an input ID from a 
communicating entity, then after the algorithm is 
executed in the PKG, QID is published in a 
publicly available directory while dID is sent to 
the communicating entity secretly. Finally, the rest 
of the algorithms (i.e. Publish, Encrypt and 
Decrypt) happen in the communicating entity, 
except that NID as one of the results of Publish 
algorithm is published in a public directory. 
Before explaining the other mechanisms in 
the proposed schemes, i.e. system and device 
initialization as well as authentication with key 
agreement, the definitions of the notations used in 
the proposed scheme is defined in Table 2. 
 
System and Device Initialization 
System initialization refers to the process related 
to IBE when PKG of an SSP! (SSP!) is started, 
while device initialization refers to the process 
followed when gateway and constrained device 
join the SSP!. During system initialization, the 
most important operation is generating params 
and master-key, then making params publicly 
available as explained in the previous section. In 
addition  to  that,  it  is  important  for the PKG of 
SSP! to have an identifier that is recognized by 
everybody(thing) through the Internet. Therefore, 
we propose the domain name as the primary 
identity representing the IoT Service Provider 
(IoTSP) and  then  the  device  identity  will be 
appended with this domain name. Having such 
identifier scheme is beneficial in the lookup 
process even though the communicating entity is 
located in different domain. 
With regards to the device initialization, 
there are two important mechanisms need to be 
performed, i.e. generation and distribution of 
device identifier and associated private key of the 
device by the PKG, and then the generation of 
sub-public and sub-private key pair by the device 
itself. In principle, distribution of device’s 
identifier and the corresponding private key by 
PKG can either be done offline and online. Offline 
method requires configuration of identifier and 
corresponding private key statically during the 
flashing time of the device, while online method 
can be done more dynamically. In this case, online 
method is chosen and a secure way of delivering 
device’s private key is proposed. 
The proposed online device initialization is 
secured by two symmetric keys, namely KInitReq 
and KInitRsp, which are one-time randomly 
generated, i.e. they will be destroyed after device 
initialization. There can be several ways in 
obtaining those keys. One practical way is by 
performing a device registration through web 
interface. After the registration process, unique 
device identifier, KInitReq and KInitRsp will be 
gen- erated for and transfered to the registered 
device (e.g. they can be loaded to the device by 
cable data after downloading from PKG). The 
reason why unique device identifier is generated 
at this point because it is possible to include more 
human friendly name into it, such as type of 
device (gateway, ECG, diabetic sensor, etc) and 
location of the device (hospital 1 or house 1, etc). 
Afterwards, the device can request its identifier 
and corresponding private key securely using 
Authenticated Encryption with Associated  Data  
(AEAD)  [17].  The  reason of choosing AEAD 
being that it is more secure to properly authen-
TABLE 1.  
SUMMARY OF ALL ALGORITHMS IN IBE WITHOUT KEY ESCROW 
Algorithm Input Output 
Setup 
1k : a security 
parameter 
s: system’s master-key (private) params:  system’s  public  parame- ters 
Extract 
ID: Identity 
s and params 
QID : public key 
dID : private key 
Publish params 
tID : sub-private key 
NID : sub-public key 
Encrypt 
m: plaintext 
ID, params, NID 
C: ciphertext 
Decrypt 
C: ciphertext 
dID , t, params 
m/ : plaintext 
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ticate the ciphertext than having simply the encry-
ption, while it works faster than secure implemen-
tation of Hash-based Message Authentication 
Code (HMAC) that requires two keys for encryp-
tion and authentication. The detail protocol of 
secure device initialization is shown in Fig. 2. 
 
Authentication Mechanism with Key Agreement 
Fig. 3 illustrates a scenario that using the propos-
ed authentication mechanism with key agreement. 
In this scenario, a mobile application’s user A 
wants to access sensor B that belongs to an IoTSP 
domain. For simplicity, user A and sensor B will 
be referred as  A and  B respectively from this 
point onwards. Moreover, A has to go through IoT 
Server (IoTS) as the entry point to B. It is assum-
ed that the activity of A in this scenario is done by 
the mobile app (either the mobile app itself or the 
server that provides API to mobile app), hence it 
is shown as one entity in Fig. 3. It can also be 
assumed that practically the entity in each domain 
(initially) does not have knowledge of system 
parameters and sub-public key of entities in other 
domains, therefore a lookup function needs to 
take place before encryption is performed. Detail 
of authentication mechanism is explained as 
follows: (1) First of all, A performs lookup in or-
der to obtain  paramsIoT SP   and NIoT S by using 
IDIoT S as input. After successful lookup, it gene-
rates QIoT S = H1IoT SP (IDIoT S), where H1IoT 
SP is included in paramsIoT SP. Note that other 
paramters in paramsIoT SP are also used for 
encryption. After-wards, C1 is created by encrypt-
ting IDA, IDB, and timestamp T using QIoT S, 
NIoT S and tA as keys. Here T is used to prevent 
replay attack. Then, IDA, IDIoT S, and C1 are 
sent to IoTS; (2) After receiving message from A, 
IoTS will perform lookup based the received IDA, 
to obtain paramsM A and NA. After successful 
lookup, it decrypts C1 using dIoT S, tIoT S and 
NA to obtain IDA, IDB, and T. After that, T is 
validated, and IDA is also verified if it similar 
with the received one. If they are valid the process 
is continued else, it stops and sends error message 
to A. After successful validation, a message that 
contains NB is encrypted as C2 using QA, NA 
and tIoT S, then C2 is sent to A. Another message 
that contains paramsM A and NA is encrypted as 
C3 by using QB, NB and tIoT S and then it is sent 
to B, informing that A wants to access it; (3) Upon 
receiving C2, it is then decrypted by A using dA, 
tA and NIoT S to obtain NB. Afterwards, A gene-
rates nonceA, then encrypt it along with IDA 
using QB, NB and tA as C4 and finally sends it to 
B; (4) Upon receiving C3 from IoTS, B decrypts 
it using dB, tB and NIoT S to obtain paramsM A 
and NA; (5) After receiving C4  from A, B decry-
pts it using dB, tB and NA to obtain nonceA. B 
then generates nonceB and use it along with 
nonceA and IDB to generate shared secret key 
with A, kBA, using a key derivation function such 
as HMAC-based Key Derivation Function 
(HKDF) [18]. After that, IDB and nonceB is 
encrypted using QA, NA and tB as C5 and a 
digest S1 is created using a message authen- 
tication code, such as HMAC [19], from message 
that consists of IDB, IDA, and nonceA with key 
kBA. Then, IDB, IDA, C5 and S1 are sent to A; 
(6) After C5 and S1 are received by A, C5 is 
decrypted by using dA, tA and NB to obtain 
nonceB. After obtaining nonceB, kBA is gene-
rated from nonceA, nonce and ID. After that, 
another S/ is generated the same way as B 
generated it using newly created kBA, and it is 
then verified against the received S1. After S1 is 
verified, another digest S2 is created from IDA, 
IDB, and nonceA with kBA and then sent to B; (7) 
After S2 is received, it is then verified by B. After 
successful verification both A and B will use kAB 
as they shared secret key. 
TABLE 2.  
DEFINITION OF USED NOTATIONS 
Notation Definition 
s 
paramsx 
IDi 
Qi 
di 
Ni 
ti 
Pm 
Cm 
E(k, N, P, A) 
 
D(k, N, C, A) 
 
Eij(m) 
Dij (m) 
Sm 
Master secret key 
Public system parameter of domain x  
Identity of entity i 
Public key of corresponding entity i 
Private key of corresponding entity i 
Sub-public key of corresponding entity i 
Sub-private key of corresponding entity i 
Plaintext from a message m or a result of decryption 
Ciphertext, a result of encrypting message m 
AEAD encryption of plaintext P, using key k, nonce N 
and associated data A 
AEAD decryption of ciphertext C, using key k, nonce N 
and associated data A 
ID based encryption of message m using Qj, Nj, and ti  
ID based decryption of message m using Qj, Nj, and ti  
Digest of message m as a result of Message Authentication 
Code (MAC) 
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By the end of this phase, both user A and 
sensor B are mutually authenticated. They can 
further communicate securely using symmetric 
key encryption, such as Advanced Encryption 
Standard (AES), with kBA that is lightweight than 
public key encryption, thus more suitable for 
constrained device. 
 
3. Results and Analysis 
 
In this section, the security capabilities of the pro-
posed scheme is analyzed. First of all, the threat 
model for the security analysis is presented. Then, 
the security features of the proposed scheme is 
analyzed. Finally, the security in terms of mutual 
authentication is discussed.  
 
Threat Model 
 
There are three types of attacker to be discussed in 
this section: (1) Oustide Attacker such as eaves-
drops on every message transmitted in the system, 
replays the previous message to receiver, decom-
poses the eavesdropped message into pieces, 
reassembles the pieces into new message, and 
sends the message to any legal entity, decrypts 
cipher text if obtain the corresponding key and 
modifies the decrypted plaintext, and utilizes the 
 
Figure 2. Device initialization protocol in a SSP! Domain 
 
 
Figure 3. Authentication mechanism with entity in different domain 
8 Jurnal Ilmu Komputer dan Informasi (Journal of a Science and Information), volume 11, issue 1, 
February 2018  
 
public key of legal entity to forge message.; (2) 
Compromised Device such as capable of every-
thing the outside attacker could do and utilizes the 
own secret key shared with MSP to decrypt 
eavesdropped message or forge message; and (3) 
Compromised SSP such as capable of everything 
the outside attacker could do and utilizes the own 
private key to decrypt eavesdropped message or 
forge message. 
 
Security Feature of The Proposed Scheme 
 
There are two main characteristics of the proposed 
scheme: (1) the message is authenticated when it 
is encrypted: When sender i communicates with 
receiver j, the sender needs to use ti to encrypt the 
message, and the receiver needs to use Ni to 
decrypt the message. Only the correct (ti, Ni) pair 
could ensure the message is encrypted and decry-
pted correctly. That means only if the message is 
encrypted by a legitimate sender i, the receiver 
could decrypt it by corresponding Ni. So the me-
ssage is authenticated with the encryption and no 
more signatures are needed; and (2) the scheme is 
without key escrow problem: When a receiver j 
wants to decrypt a message, it needs to use dj and 
tj. The dj is known to the receiver, and the SSP 
and the tj is only known to the receiver. So even 
the SSP is compromised or the private key dj is 
leaked, the message could still only be decrypted 
by the receiver because of the tj. So the existence 
of tj  solves the key escrow problem. Whats more, 
the updating of tj improves the security of the 
authentication scheme. 
 
Mutual Authentication 
 
A mutual authentication among a user from hos-
pital, a medical sensor, and the SSP1! (SSP1!) can 
be achieved with the authentication scheme. The 
ID of hospital user is verified by the SSP1! in step 
2 of the authentication mechanism. Only message 
encrypted by legitimate hospital user could be 
decrypted by the SSP1! with associated sub-
public key NID. Furthermore, the sub-secret key 
tID ensures that only the legitimate mobile user 
could make the message authenticated with encry-
ption and only the target sensor could decrypt that 
message and the other way around. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
To ensure the security and privacy of  IoT-based  
health care system is a very challenging task. It 
becomes more challenging due to the fact that IoT 
is mostly used to connect between patients with 
medical institutions or among several health care 
providers that are located across different domains 
with different trust authority. A scheme based on  
IBC  has been proposed to secure communication 
in IoT-based health care system across multiple 
domains. The main contributions include authenti-
cation mechanism based on IBE that has key- 
escrow free feature, mechanism to lookup for IBE 
system parameters in other domains and to gene-
rate shared secret key for secure communication 
between communicating entities. Security analysis 
on the threat model, security feature, and mutual 
authentication has also been presented. 
In order to enable verification and add more 
security on the identity, a cryptographic identity 
could be used instead of a plain identity, which is 
still left as an open issue. Furthermore, an exten-
sion of the proposed scheme with the extended 
IoT- based health care system architecture needs 
to be considered in order to take into account 
more stakeholders as discussed in the model pro-
posed by [16]. Finally, implementation of the pro-
posed scheme in the prototype or actual IoT 
system is another future work in order to measure 
the performance and practical feasibility of it.  
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